Abstract. We consider a service system in which customers are loss averse toward both price and delay attributes. That is, customers compare these two attributes with their rational expectations of outcomes, with losses being more painful than equal-sized gains are pleasant. We first study customers' equilibrium queueing strategies. We find that, unlike the traditional case in which loss aversion is not considered, there may exist three equilibrium strategies, one of which is preferred in the sense that customers' utility is highest at this equilibrium. We then investigate the optimal pricing problem for a monopoly server and find that loss aversion polarizes queues, making long queues even longer and short queues even shorter. Furthermore, loss aversion toward the delay attribute drives the optimal price down, whereas loss aversion toward the price attribute drives it up. We also find that profit-and welfare-maximizing prices are not the same in a monopoly market. Finally, we consider pricing competition in a symmetric duopoly market and find that the conclusions depend on the size of the service capacity relative to the market size. For fast servers, there exists a unique symmetric price equilibrium. Under certain conditions, the effect of loss aversion on waiting time drives the price down, whereas that on the monetary term drives it up. For moderate-speed servers, there also exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. However, the effect of loss aversion on the two attributes works in reverse compared with that in the fast server case. For slow servers, we show that a symmetric equilibrium may not exist, and we numerically find that there may exist two asymmetric equilibria. Interestingly, with loss-averse customers, a firm can obtain a higher profit in a duopoly market than in a monopoly market.
Introduction
Customers who seek service often assess two attributes of potential service systems: the net monetary reward (service reward-price) and the waiting time. A mental accounting of these two attributes determines whether the customer should join the service system or balk. In the classic literature (Hassin and Haviv 2003) , customers are often assumed to be fully rational, in the sense that a simple utility function (the net monetary reward minus the cost of waiting) is used to represent the mental accounting process. However, this modeling approach may overlook features of customers' mental accounting activities in a queueing game.
According to the literature on service quality and customer satisfaction, a customer's satisfaction (utility) with a service is greatly affected by her expectations of the service attributes, with higher expectations often leading to lower utility, and vice versa (Parasuraman et al. 1985 , Anderson and Sullivan 1993 , Lin et al. 2008 . Such expectations are known as reference points, and such customers are said to be reference dependent. This is also consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) , which demonstrates that people generally view a final outcome as a gain or a loss with respect to a certain reference point, which in our context is customer expectation. Nowadays, the abundance and ease of accessibility of information online allows customers to naturally form expectations that reflect real system performance before seeking a service. For example, the Ministry of Health of the province of Ontario posts emergency room, surgery, and diagnostic imaging waiting time information on its government website (http://www.health.gov.on.ca/ en/public/programs/waittimes/, accessed April 20, 2016) .
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Operations Research, 2018 , vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 761-777, © 2018 Loss aversion reflects customer behavior in the sense that compared with reference points on price and delay, losses are more painful than equal-sized gains are pleasant (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . There is a substantial body of anecdotal and empirical evidence of customer loss aversion on price and service quality attributes. For example, Lin et al. (2008) empirically study passengers' loss aversion effects in a transportation system. They show that compared with passengers' service quality expectations, which generally include ticket fare, waiting time, and travel time, service quality loss influences passengers' repurchase intentions more than service quality gain.
There is a difference between customers' mental accounting of money and time. According to Abdellaoui and Kemel (2014) , there are three main differences between time and money. First, time is less fungible than money. Second, time cannot be easily saved or stored, and hence its aggregation is difficult. Third, people are less capable of accounting for time than they are for money. These differences imply that people can have different degrees of loss aversion toward money and time attributes. Using a lab test, Abdellaoui and Kemel (2014) confirm that loss aversion exists in both money and time attributes, but to different degrees. Tereyağoğlu et al. (2018) use ticket sales data from a theater and find that customers are reference dependent on both price and capacity sold (which indicates the congestion level of seating zones) in making their purchasing decisions. They show that customers are loss averse on both attributes and that the degree of loss aversion differs between these two attributes. Given these empirical findings, the monetary rewards and time attributes in a customer's utility must be considered separately, using different loss aversion parameter values.
To explicitly consider the foregoing three issues, we adopt prospect theory by assuming that customers are reference dependent on their expectations regarding two attributes: price and waiting time. Under this assumption, we study customers' equilibrium queueing strategies and firms' pricing decisions to answer the following questions. How do reference price and waiting time affect a loss-averse customer's joining behavior? What is the optimal pricing strategy for a monopoly server when customers are loss averse toward both price and waiting time? Do the social planner and monopoly server price differently when customers are loss averse? When the servers are engaged in a duopoly price competition, how does customer loss aversion behavior affect their pricing decisions and system performance? We provide detailed answers to these questions in the remainder of the introduction.
Following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) , we posit that a customer's overall utility has two components: intrinsic utility and gain-loss utility. Intrinsic utility measures the direct effects of service attributes. Gain-loss utility is derived from a customer comparing the net monetary reward (service reward-price) and waiting time outcomes with the customer's expectations of those outcomes and losses being more painful than equal-sized gains are pleasant. A customer's reference points for the net reward and delay are fully endogenized as the customer's rational expectations of the outcomes of these two attributes (Kőszegi and Rabin 2006) . Because of the stochastic property of waiting time, we further assume the expectations to be stochastic. This assumption is supported by the experimental study conducted by Rust et al. (1999) . They show that a customer's service quality expectation is a probability density function that describes the relative likelihood of a particular quality outcome. In our context, this implies that the delay a customer expects to experience is stochastic and that a customer derives her gain-loss utility from comparing the real waiting time with her expectation.
Applying the concept of personal equilibrium proposed by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) , we further define customer equilibrium in our queueing game as follows. On the basis of her reference points, a customer derives the gain-loss utility, which along with her intrinsic utility determines her optimal choice (whether to join or to balk). The customer's choice, along with the choices of all other customers, generates the outcomes of the waiting time and net reward, which are consistent with the customer's rational expectations (i.e., reference points).
We begin by conducting an equilibrium analysis of customers' queueing strategies. In sharp contrast to the uniqueness of the equilibrium in cases where loss aversion is not considered, we find that multiple equilibria are typical when customers are loss averse. Specifically, deviating from a customer's original plan probably causes a loss (see Kőszegi and Rabin 2006) . If a customer had planned to join a service, she would feel a loss of service value if she did not join, and her aversion to this loss would lead her to join the service even when the expected waiting time was long. However, if the customer had planned to balk, joining the service would bring her a loss in terms of waiting cost, and her aversion to this loss would lead her not to join. We find that there are at most three equilibrium strategies, only one of which is the preferred personal equilibrium, which yields the largest expected utility for customers of all of the equilibria.
Next, we consider a service firm's optimal pricing decision in a monopoly market. Interestingly, we show that, under optimal pricing, customers are either more or less likely to join the queue than in the traditional case in which customer loss aversion is not considered. Specifically, if the traditional joining probability is high, meaning that the service reward is relatively high compared with the marginal cost of waiting, then loss aversion results in an even higher joining probability as customers care more about the loss of the service reward than the gain of not having to wait. However, if the traditional joining probability is low, meaning that the marginal cost of waiting is relatively high compared with the service reward, then loss aversion results in an even lower joining probability, as customers try to avoid waiting. In short, loss aversion polarizes queues such that long queues become even longer and short queues even shorter. 1 We further show that both optimal price and joining probability decrease when customers are more loss averse toward waiting time and increase when they are more loss averse toward the net service reward.
We then study the welfare maximization problem and compare its optimal price with that of the profit maximization problem. It is well known that in an unobservable queue, without loss aversion, the welfareand profit-maximizing prices are equivalent when customers are identical (Edelson and Hildebrand 1975) . However, this conclusion no longer holds in our case, as the gain-loss utility is included in the welfare function, and thus social welfare is always smaller than profit. We identify the sufficient conditions under which the profit-maximizing joining probability is larger than the socially desired joining probability.
Finally, we examine the price competition with lossaverse customers in a duopoly market. Compared with the monopoly case, customers in this setting have an expanded choice set from two options (balking and joining) to three options (balking, joining server 1, or joining server 2). We consider a symmetric setting in which the service rates of two firms are equal. We find that the equilibrium structure hinges on the size of the service capacity-specifically, whether the capacity is ample, moderate, or scarce. We call servers in the corresponding cases the fast, moderate-speed, and slow servers, respectively.
For fast servers, there exists a unique symmetric price equilibrium under which customers all join and equally split between two servers. Moreover, the customers obtain a higher utility from joining than from balking. We then obtain two striking results. First, when the service reward is high, loss aversion on the monetary term drives the price down, whereas that toward waiting time drives the price up. The equilibrium price here can be higher than that when loss aversion is not considered, as we consider loss aversion in terms of two attributes: price and waiting time. When the degree of loss aversion on waiting time is high, a server tries to increase its price to reduce congestion. Unfortunately, the other server does the same, and eventually, congestion is not reduced, but the price is increased at equilibrium. Higher equilibrium prices along with an unchanged congestion level imply that loss aversion related to waiting time may harm customers, contradicting the results of many studies indicating that reference effects and loss aversion generally benefit customers (Heidhues and Kőszegi 2008, Yang et al. 2014) . The second striking result is that introducing a competitor does not necessarily harm the firm. This is in sharp contrast to the classic literature, which indicates that a firm's profit in a duopoly competition market cannot be higher than its monopoly profit. The reason is that introducing an additional firm allows more customers to be served, which affects a customer's reference point and makes the balking option less attractive. The strengthened joining incentives from customers allow the two servers to increase their prices, resulting in a possibly higher profit for each server under competition than what they would obtain as monopolies.
For moderate-speed servers, there still exists a unique symmetric price equilibrium under which customers all join and equally split between two servers. However, the customers obtain the same utility from joining as they do from balking. Unexpectedly, the effect of loss aversion on the two attributes now works in reverse compared with the fast server case. That is, the effect of loss aversion on waiting time decreases the price, whereas that on the monetary term increases the price. Again, we find that competition can benefit a server compared with the monopoly case.
For slow servers, we show that there could exist a continuum of symmetric equilibria when the service rate is below a threshold. However, when the service rate is above this threshold, a symmetric equilibrium may not exist. The possible nonexistence of symmetric equilibrium is caused by a server's kinked profit function at the kink point where its price equals that of its competitor. When the profit function is kinked, a symmetric equilibrium requires the left-hand derivative of the server's profit function with respect to its price to be nonnegative and the corresponding right-hand derivative to be nonpositive at the kink point. However, with balking customers and loss-averse customer preferences, increasing the server's price in the region right above its competitor's price may be more beneficial than doing so in the region right below its competitor's price. In other words, the right-hand derivative may be larger than the left-hand derivative (and hence the requirements regarding the signs of the left-and right-hand derivatives at the kink point may not be satisfied simultaneously). Note that increasing a server's price in the region right above its competitor's price implies that the server is charging a price higher than that of its competitor. Hence, this server is positioned "closer" to the balking option than its competitor in terms of both the monetary reward and waiting time attributes. Consequently, this server together with the balking option has more influence on the customer's reference points than the competitor. Thus, customer loss aversion further mitigates the server's demand loss from the increased price. We note that Luski (1976) Operations Research, 2018 , vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 761-777, © 2018 shows that the existence of balking customers and the heterogeneity of customer delay sensitivity drive the two servers to offer heterogeneous service products. Our result here further demonstrates that the existence of balking customers and loss aversion preferences can also drive the two servers to do so.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature. In Section 3, we consider a monopoly server case and study both customers' equilibrium queueing strategies and servers' optimal pricing decisions. In Section 4, we further examine the duopoly case and derive the equilibrium prices of the two servers. In Section 5, we provide concluding remarks. All the proofs are relegated to the online appendix.
Literature Review
This work is closely related to three streams of literature: customers' loss aversion behavior in behavioral economics, reference effects in operations management (more specifically, service management), and customer queueing strategies and optimal firm decisions in queueing systems.
Customer loss aversion behavior was first modeled in prospect theory, as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) recently developed a model to consider the rational expectationbased reference points and the effect of loss aversion on firm pricing strategies. We use this rational expectation-based framework to consider customer loss aversion behavior in a service setting. Although we along with Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) consider loss aversion in two dimensions, these two dimensions are different. In Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) , the two dimensions are the product and price. The two dimensions we consider are the monetary reward and delay. This is due to the different contexts. The stochastic outcome in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) is caused by the multiple prices a customer may face, whereas the stochastic outcome in our model comes from two sources: the probability choice over queueing options and the randomness of waiting time.
Since Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) , several studies have examined pricing issues with loss-averse customers. Heidhues and Kőszegi (2008) examine price competition when customers base their references on their recent expectations of a product. They show the existence of a focal price equilibrium in the presence of loss aversion. Karle and Peitz (2014) also examine firm price competition but only in the context of a proportion of customers being reference dependent. They show that a larger proportion of fully rational customers leads to a more competitive outcome. Baron et al. (2015) investigate a situation in which a newsvendor sells to strategic customers who have stochastic reference points toward both price and product availability. They find that expected price and firm profit may increase with the level of customer loss aversion. These studies consider pricing strategy in a traditional goods market rather than in a service operational setting. Lindsey (2011) studies congestion pricing given reference-dependent preferences in a transportation setting, yet we consider neither the congestion in a queueing framework nor the competitive pricing issue.
Our work contributes to the recent stream of research on reference effects in operations management (Popescu and Wu 2007 , Nasiry and Popescu 2011 , Roels and Su 2014 , Baron et al. 2015 , Chen et al. 2016 ). Popescu and Wu (2007) consider a dynamic pricing setting wherein the demand is a general referencedependent function. They show that a firm's optimal pricing path either decreases or increases in the presence of a reference effect. Nasiry and Popescu (2011) examine the same setting in which customers anchor to the lowest and most recent prices. They reveal that a range of constant pricing policies is optimal. Both of these works consider the reference effect in a traditional goods setting in which customers are reference dependent on a single price attribute and the reference price is a single point. By contrast, we consider a service operational setting wherein customers' reference points on the two attributes are stochastic, as information becomes more accessible and abundant. Roels and Su (2014) show that the reference point can be engineered by a social planner to achieve her objectives when individuals are behind averse and ahead seeking. The social planner can use the full reference distribution of outputs or an aggregate reference point.
To the best of our knowledge, the work of Yang et al. (2014) is alone in examining customer loss aversion in the context of service competition. They consider duopoly competition over waiting time when customers are reference dependent on the delay. Our work differs from theirs in three aspects. First, in their model, customers are reference dependent only on the delay attribute, whereas in our model, they are reference dependent on both the price and delay attributes. Second, in their model, a reference point is determined by the waiting-time decisions of two firms, whereas we model a customer's reference point as her lagged rational expectations of the delay and price outcomes. Third, in their model, servers directly compete over delay by choosing their service rates, whereas in our model, servers compete over prices.
Our work is also closely related to the literature that examines customers' queueing strategies and firms' optimal decisions in a service system; see Hassin and Haviv (2003) for a comprehensive review. One stream of literature focuses on fully rational customers (Cachon and Harker 2002 , Chen and Wan 2003 , Chen and Frank 2004 , Ho and Zheng 2004 , Allon and Federgruen 2007 , Debo et al. 2012 , Afèche et al. 2013 ). For instance, Afèche et al. (2013) study revenue-maximizing tariffs that depend on realized lead times when customers are risk averse regarding uncertain lead times. By contrast, we consider customer loss aversion behavior driven by waiting time uncertainty. Chen and Frank (2004) consider firms' pricing decisions in a monopoly service setting, and Chen and Wan (2003) examine price competition in a duopoly setting. In the absence of reference effects and loss aversion, our monopoly and duopoly models are reduced to those in the preceding two studies, respectively. By comparing our results with those obtained using traditional models, we show the effects of loss aversion on customers' equilibrium queueing strategies and firms' pricing decisions. Another emerging stream of literature considers boundedly rational customers, assuming that customers choose servers following a multinomial logit choice model (Shang and Liu 2011 , Huang et al. 2013 , Aksoy-Pierson et al. 2013 , Li et al. 2016 . Unlike the aforementioned work, we assume that customers are loss averse when they form preferences.
The Monopoly Case
In this section, we consider the monopoly case in which there is one server in the market. The customers, who are assumed to be identical, arrive to the system according to a Poisson process with rate λ, which is normalized to 1. The queue is unobservable, and the customers decide to join or balk upon arrival based on the system's long-run statistics. The service times are independent and identically distributed. and exponentially distributed with rate µ.
In the following subsections, we discuss the reference-dependent utility for loss-averse customers. We then consider customer equilibrium queueing strategies. Finally, we study profit-and welfare-maximizing prices.
Reference-Dependent Utility
A customer who decides to join a service facility obtains a service reward, R, but must pay a price P and suffers a realized waiting cost. The customer's waiting cost is assumed to be proportional to her sojourn time, which is the sum of her waiting time in the queue and her service time. Hereafter, we refer to the sojourn time as the waiting time. A customer's expected waiting cost is θw, where w is the expected waiting time and θ is the unit-time waiting cost parameter. Hence, this customer's intrinsic utility is R − P − θw. Balking leads to an intrinsic utility of 0.
A customer's overall expected utility is the sum of her intrinsic utility and gain-loss utility, where the latter represents the additional utility the customer derives from comparing the actual outcomes to the reference points. We assume that service reward R and price P are deterministic. Hence, it is the waiting time uncertainty rather than the price uncertainty that a loss-averse customer faces in our system. In addition, as a customer always receives both the reward and price or neither depending on whether she joins the queue or balks, we can combine the service reward and price into a single attribute, R − P, referred to as the monetary reward. This is different from Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) and Lindsey (2011) , who consider random prices and treat price P as a different attribute than service reward R. In our setting, a customer's intrinsic utility consists of two attributes, net monetary reward R − P and waiting time, which are on different psychological dimensions (Abdellaoui and Kemel 2014) . We assume that the customer forms reference points for each of them.
Following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) , we posit that a customer's reference points for the net reward and delay are fully endogenized as her rational expectations for the outcomes of these two attributes, which are consistent with real outcomes. The popularity of websites, such as Yelp.com, and social media platforms, such as Facebook, makes this assumption quite reasonable. In addition to her own past experiences, a customer can easily obtain other customers' experiences with a service system's waiting times online before joining the service. Hence, we assume that a customer knows the waiting time distribution of the server or, equivalently, the joining probability of other customers (denoted as δ).
Consider a tagged customer who plans to join a system with probability δ p and expects to receive a net reward of R − P and experience a random waiting time of W. Given that all other customers join the system with probability δ, the random waiting time W that the tagged customer expects to experience is an exponential random variable with a mean of w 1/(µ − δ) (i.e., W ∼ exp(µ − δ)). The tagged customer plans to balk with probability 1 − δ p and expects to receive 0 net reward and experience 0 waiting time. These net reward and delay outcome expectations are naturally treated as her reference points. Thus, the reference point for the net monetary reward, denoted asV, is a random variable defined as follows:
V R − P, with probability δ p ; 0, with probability 1 − δ p .
The reference point of the waiting time is also a random variable, denoted asŴ, and is defined by the following expression:Ŵ W, with probability δ p ; 0, with probability 1 − δ p .
Let F(t) be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of W. The CDF ofŴ can then be written as follows:
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Gain and loss due to payment
Loss and gain due to waiting time , where x + max{0, x} and x − min{0, x}. The parameters α( 1) and β( 1) measure the degree of customer loss aversion related to net reward and waiting, respectively. When they are greater than 1, customers are loss averse and care more about a loss than about an equalsized gain. Empirical studies (Abdellaoui and Kemel 2014, Tereyağoğlu et al. 2018 ) have shown that customers have different degrees of loss aversion toward the net reward and waiting time. We thus use different loss aversion parameters. Let t be the realized waiting time. Thus, the distribution of t is the same as the distribution of the waiting time the customer plans to experience if she joins the queue. That is, F(t) F(r). Substituting (1) into the overall expected utility expression yields the following:
The detailed calculation of this utility function is listed in Online Appendix B. The joining utility expression contains only parameter β. It does not contain parameter α, as the customer only experiences a loss as a result of waiting when she joins the service. Although the customer obtains an intrinsic utility of 0 when she balks, her overall expected utility from balking is
Loss due to losing the net reward
Gain due to avoiding waiting , where the first term measures the loss resulting from losing the net reward, R − P, and is thus multiplied by parameter α, and the second term measures the gain resulting from the avoidance of waiting and is thus not multiplied by parameter β. Again, by using (1), the balking utility is
In sharp contrast to traditional studies, the utility from balking can be a nonzero value, as balking generates mixed feelings for customers, such as losses from losing the service value and gains from avoiding waiting.
Customer Equilibrium
A customer makes her joining/balking decision by comparing her overall expected utility from joining the service with that from balking. Denote δ o as the optimal joining probability, then δ o 1(0, respectively) if U(Join) is larger (smaller, respectively) than U(Balk). Otherwise, when U(Join) equals U(Balk), δ o can be any value between 0 and 1. To derive the customer equilibrium, we consider the following difference:
where w 1/(µ − δ) (recall that total arrival rate λ 1).
In the classical queueing game without considering the reference effect, the customer equilibrium requires a tagged customer's joining action to be the best response to the other customers' joining strategies. As customers are identical, the queueing game has indistinguishable infinitely many players. As is often the case in the queueing game literature, we consider only the symmetric equilibrium in which customers adopt the same joining strategy (Hassin and Haviv 2003) . In our case, it is required that δ o δ. Moreover, after considering the reference effect, the concept of customer equilibrium has another layer of requirement. That is, a customer's reference points,V andŴ, must be consistent with the net reward and the delay outcomes generated by the customer's optimal strategy, δ o . In other words, the customer's joining plan is consistent with her realized optimal choice; that is, δ p δ o . This is defined as personal equilibrium in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) . To conclude, customer equilibrium in our setting requires that δ o δ p δ. Thus, in the following equilibrium analysis, we keep notation δ and get rid of the other two δs. The utility difference in (4) then becomes the following:
There exist three types of equilibrium. If g(0) 0, then "all balk" is a pure-strategy equilibrium. If g(1) 0, then "all join" is a pure-strategy equilibrium. If the customers adopt a mixed strategy (i.e., 0 < δ < 1), then the equilibrium joining probability must solve the equation g(δ) 0. Note that in this case, we have U(Join) U(Balk) < 0. When customers are loss neutral in terms of the two attributes (i.e., α β 1), the equation g(δ) 0 is reduced to R − P − θw 0 (the equilibrium equation for the traditional case without considering reference effects; see section 1.1 of Hassin and Haviv 2003) , suggesting that loss-neutral customers behave in the same way as reference-independent customers, in which case the equilibrium is unique. However, in general, the uniqueness of the equilibrium no longer holds.
To find the number of equilibria for the general case, we first provide the following structural property of the function g(δ).
Lemma 1 shows that the function g(δ) 0 has at most two solutions, implying that there are at most three equilibria for the entire game; see Online Appendix A for the details of the equilibria. Figure 1 illustrates such a three-equilibria case.
In the classic M/M/1 model without considering loss aversion behavior, as more customers intend to join the queue, the system becomes more congested, which reduces a tagged customer's tendency to join. Such avoid-the-crowd behavior ensures that at most one equilibrium exists in the customer queueing game; see section 1.6 of Hassin and Haviv (2003) . Why do we have multiple equilibria here? The driving force for our multiple equilibria lies in the rational expectation-based reference effect and customer loss aversion behavior. That is, deviating from a customer's original plan probably causes the customer a loss (Kőszegi and Rabin 2006) . Here, customers treat the outcomes of their plans as reference points. If a customer had planned to join the service, she would feel a loss of service value if she did not join, and her aversion to this loss would lead her to join the service even when the expected waiting time was long. However, if she had planned to balk, joining the service would bring the customer a loss in terms of waiting cost, and her aversion to this loss would lead her not to join. Indeed, in the presence of loss aversion behavior (i.e., α, β > 1), the utility difference between joining and balking increases in the customer's planned joining probability, δ p , as shown in (4). This implies that a customer's actual joining incentive becomes stronger as her planned joining probability increases. The existence of multiple equilibria is also found in other settings with rational expectation-based customer loss aversion behavior (Kőszegi and Rabin 2006 , Heidhues and Kőszegi 2008 , Karle and Peitz 2014 , Baron et al. 2015 . Remark 1. Consider the three-equilibria case depicted in Figure 1 . Between the two mixed-strategy equilibria represented by the two g(δ) 0 solutions, the smaller one must be locally unstable, as a slight decrease in δ would result in U(Join) < U(Balk), and thus more customers would balk, making δ even smaller. A slight increase in δ would result in U(Join) > U(Balk) and attract more customers to join. By contrast, the largest and smallest of the three equilibria are both locally stable. Between these two equilibria, we choose the one that generates a larger expected utility, known as the preferred personal equilibrium (PPE) Rabin 2006, p. 1144) . Among the three equilibria, the smallest yields zero utility for customers, whereas the mediumsized and largest both yield a negative utility. Thus, the one with a joining probability of 0 is the PPE in this example.
Although there may be multiple equilibria, there exists a unique PPE for the entire game, as stated in the following proposition. First, let 
768
Operations Research, 2018 , vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 761-777, © 2018 When the service capacity is ample, such that µ μ, then (a) if P P , "all join" is the PPE i.e., δ
Remark 2. In the limiting case with α 1 and β 1, the two bounds for the price areP R − θ(1/(µ − 1)) and P R − θ(1/µ), and the threshold for the capacity is µ +∞. For this loss-neutral customer case, case (3) in Proposition 1 disappears, and cases (1) and (2) define the customer equilibrium, consistent with the results in the literature (Hassin and Haviv 2003, p. 46) . Case (3) is particularly interesting as it shows that when the service capacity is larger thanμ, the purchasing behavior of loss-averse customers is similar to that seen in a traditional goods market. That is, there exists a cutoff threshold regarding price P below which everyone buys and above which nobody buys. This is because, when the service capacity is ample, the effect of loss aversion on the net reward dominates its effect on the delay.
When the PPE is a mixed-strategy equilibrium (i.e., δ PPE ∈ (0, 1)), the joining probability δ PPE decreases in price. To see this, note that the derivative of function g(δ) with respect to service price P is negative. Hence, as P increases, the function g(δ) decreases and its larger root becomes smaller. This suggests that δ PPE is smaller as it is essentially the larger root of the equation g(δ) 0 as shown in the proof of Proposition 1. Similarly, as α(respectively, β) increases, function g(δ) increases (respectively, decreases), leading to a larger (respectively, smaller) δ PPE .
Profit and Welfare Maximization
In this section, we study the optimal pricing problem given that customers make their queueing decisions according to their reference-dependent utility. When there exist multiple equilibria in the customer queueing game, we consider the PPE. In the following, we first consider the decision maker to be a profit-maximizing service provider and then a welfaremaximizing social planner. The profit-maximizing service provider chooses a price to maximize its expected profit, Π, as follows:
According to Proposition 1, whenP 0, the equilibrium joining strategy is δ PPE 0. Thus, we assumeP > 0 to avoid the trivial case in which the server receives zero demand. This condition can be rewritten as R > θ(β + 1)/(2µ). Note that customer loss aversion (β > 1) reduces the server's profitability.
As shown in Proposition 1, when µ μ, the profitmaximizing price approachesP from the left and the corresponding equilibrium joining probability δ *
1.
We thus focus on the case of µ <μ. From Proposition 1, we know that for every price, P, there exists a unique positive δ PPE . We begin by investigating the structural property of the profit function when µ <μ and P <P, especially when a mixed-strategy equilibrium is involved, corresponding to cases (1)(a) and (2)(b) of Proposition 1. As a mixed-strategy equilibrium joining probability solves g(δ) 0, we can replace P in the profit function with the following function of δ:
(α − 1)δ + 2 represents the adjusted marginal cost of waiting in the presence of reference effects. We can then consider δ as the decision variable instead of P.
Lemma 2. The profit function, Π, is concave in δ when µ <μ and P <P.
According to Lemma 2, the first-order condition (FOC) is sufficient to derive the optimal price and corresponding equilibrium joining probability. The equilibrium joining probability is determined by the following FOC:
Note that when customers are loss neutral, (6) is reduced to the traditional FOC without considering the reference effect; that is, R − θw 2 µ 0. We next investigate the effect of customer loss aversion on the optimal price and equilibrium joining probability.
Proposition 2. In a monopoly setting, both the optimal price, P * , and the corresponding equilibrium joining probability, δ * , increase with α and decrease with β.
Recall that δ PPE decreases with P, as stated in Remark 2. Hence, one may believe that the effect of the loss aversion parameter, α or β, on the optimal price, P * , is simply the opposite of that on δ * . However, Proposition 2 shows that this is not the case. When customers are more loss averse toward waiting time (i.e., when β increases), they are less likely to join the service. Thus, to obtain more profit, the server must lower its price to attract more customers. If customers are more loss averse toward the net monetary reward (i.e., if α increases), they are more likely to join the service to avoid losing the monetary reward. The server is then entitled to charge a higher price.
We now compare the optimal price, P * , and the corresponding equilibrium joining probability, δ * , with those in the traditional case without considering customer loss aversion. Note that in the traditional setting, if the market size is sufficiently large compared with the service capacity, µ, the equilibrium joining probability, δ trad , solves the following equation: If the equilibrium joining probability in the traditional case is high (δ trad >δ), then the net monetary reward is relatively high compared with the marginal cost of waiting. Loss aversion behavior results in an even higher joining probability. The mentality is, "given that others are suffering a long wait, I will not bother to wait longer." This reference effect mitigates customers' feelings of loss, which helps them tolerate a longer waiting time in crowded environments, such as border-crossing systems. However, if the equilibrium joining probability in the traditional case is low (δ trad δ ), the marginal cost of waiting is relatively high compared with the net service reward. Loss aversion behavior results in an even lower joining probability, as customers try to avoid loss from the delay. Consequently, customers' loss aversion behavior polarizes the queue, making short queues even shorter and long queues even longer. Polarized queue length has been widely observed in practice (e.g., see examples in Bikhchandani et al. 1992) . Managers should be aware of this polarizing effect as it can otherwise cause misunderstandings in terms of customers' patience levels. For example, for a manager who wants to estimate the customer delay sensitivity parameter, θ, ignoring the polarizing effect can lead to underestimation of this parameter for heavy-traffic systems and overestimation for light-traffic systems.
We now consider the social welfare-maximizing problem, which maximizes the sum of the aggregate reference-dependent utilities of all customers (including balking customers) and the server's profit. Note that customers' gain-loss utilities are included in the welfare function, which "respects the principle of consumer sovereignty" (Lindsey 2011 (Lindsey , p. 1518 .
The social planner makes its pricing decision to maximize social welfare, SW, as follows:
The difference between social welfare, SW, and the server's profit, Π, is expressed as follows:
If α β 1, meaning that customers are loss neutral (loss and gain are weighted equally), the aforementioned difference is reduced to 0. Profit and social welfare maximization yield the same pricing decision. A similar result is identified by Edelson and Hildebrand (1975) , who consider identical customers with intrinsic utilities. However, if either loss aversion parameter α or β is greater than 1, social welfare is always smaller than the servers' profit as loss-averse customers place more weight on losses than on gains and servers fail to internalize customers' excess loss resulting from loss aversion. In this case, the profit-maximizing price differs from the welfare-maximizing price. Denoting the welfare-maximizing joining probability as δ s , we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. In a monopoly setting, if either µ 2 or µ > 2 and α < 1/(1 − 2/µ), the profit-maximizing joining probability is larger than the socially desired joining probability i.e., δ * > δ s .
As stated, with customer loss aversion, the server cannot absorb the entire customer surplus. Thus, when customers do not care much about losing the service reward (i.e., α is small), the social planner charges a higher price than the profit-maximizing server, which results in a lower joining probability. Doing this reduces not only the joining customers' congestioninduced utility loss but also the unhappiness of the balking customers. If neither of the two conditions in Proposition 4 holds, the relationship between δ * and δ s cannot be determined analytically.
The Duopoly Case
In the foregoing section, we study the pricing problem in a monopoly setting in which customers have two options: to join a queue or to balk. We now further examine the pricing problem in a duopoly setting with two symmetric servers that have the same service rate, µ. No matter which server customers join, they receive the same service reward, R, and incur the same unit waiting cost, θ. We specifically consider the following twostage game: In the first stage, server i determines its price, P i , to maximize its revenue, i 1, 2, and commits to it. In the second stage, arriving customers, who are assumed to be identical and to have full knowledge of the prices of the two servers, choose from the following three options: joining server 1, joining server 2, or balking. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this aforementioned two-stage game can be solved via backward induction. First, given a price pair, (P 1 , P 2 ), we derive the corresponding customer equilibrium queueing strategy. Then, anticipating the second-stage customer equilibrium queueing strategy, we investigate the price competition game between the two servers.
Customer Equilibrium in Parallel Queues
In this subsection, we study the second-stage queueing game among customers given a price pair, (P 1 , P 2 ). Similar to the monopoly setting, customers arrive Operations Research, 2018 , vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 761-777, © 2018 according to a Poisson process with rate λ 1. We posit that before taking any joining or balking actions, a customer knows the market shares of servers 1 and 2 (δ 1 and δ 2 ), that is, the joining probability of other customers. Hence, the customer knows the waiting time distributions of the two servers if she chooses to join one of them. In addition, we assume a customer plans to join server i with probability δ pi and expects to receive a net reward and experience a delay according to her plan, which are naturally treated as her reference points.
We thus assume that a tagged customer expects to choose server i with probability δ pi , pays price P i , experiences random waiting time W i , and expects to balk with probability 1 − δ p1 − δ p2 . The reference point for the net monetary reward,V, is thus a random variable defined as follows:
, with probability δ p1 ; R − P 2 , with probability δ p2 ; 0, with probability 1 − δ p1 − δ p2 .
The reference point for the delay, denoted asŴ, is a random variable defined as follows:
, with probability δ p1 ; W 2 , with probability δ p2 ; 0, with probability 1 − δ p1 − δ p2 .
Here, W i is a random variable following an exponential distribution with a rate of µ i − δ i ; that is, W i ∼ exp(µ i − δ i ). Let F i (t) be the CDF of W i . The CDF ofŴ, denoted as HŴ (r), can thus be written as follows:
On the basis of the reference points for the net monetary reward and waiting time, the tagged customer derives her gain-loss utility, which along with her intrinsic utility further determines her optimal choice. We first consider the case in which P 1 P 2 . Let w i , i 1, 2 denote the expected waiting time of server i. The tagged customer's utility from choosing server 1 can be derived as follows:
Loss from paying a higher price than P 2
Gain from obtaining the service
Loss and gain due to delay , where the first and second terms in the square brackets represent loss and gain, respectively. In the preceding equation, the first term measures the intrinsic utility of joining server 1. The second term measures the customer's loss as a result of paying price P 1 , higher than her plan of paying price P 2 with server 2. The third term measures the customer's gain from obtaining the net service reward from server 1 compared with her plan of balking. The fourth term measures the aggregate gain and loss resulting from the difference between the customer's realized and reference waiting times. The detailed calculation of the double integration is provided in Online Appendix B. The utility function, U 1 , can be further simplified as follows:
Analogously, one can obtain the customer's utility from joining server 2 as follows:
Intrinsic utility
Gain from paying a lower price than P 1
Loss and gain due to the difference between experienced and benchmark delay .
Similar to the monopoly case, the utility of balking consists of two parts:
Gain due to avoiding waiting
The utilities from joining these two servers and from balking determine the customer's optimal choices, denoted as δ o1 and δ o2 . For instance, if U 1 > U 2 and U 1 > U b , the optimal choices for the tagged customer are δ o1 1 and δ o2 0. Similar to the monopoly case, here we consider the symmetric equilibrium for customers' queueing games in which customers adopt the same joining strategy, which requires that δ o1 δ 1 and δ o2 δ 2 . Moreover, following the requirement of personal equilibrium in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006), a tagged customer's joining plan (based on which the customer forms her reference points) should be consistent with her realized optimal strategy; that is, δ p1 δ o1 and δ p2 δ o2 . In short, the customer equilibrium in our setting requires that δ p1 δ o1 δ 1 and δ p2 δ o2 δ 2 . Thus, in the following equilibrium analysis, we keep only notations δ 1 and δ 2 .
Similarly, for the case in which P 1 P 2 , customers' utilities from joining server 1, joining server 2, and balking can be written, respectively, as follows:
Because of the effect of loss aversion on price (α > 1), the utilities from joining servers 1 and 2 (U 1 and U 2 , respectively) when P 1 P 2 are different from those when P 1 P 2 . In other words, utility functions U 1 and U 2 are not smooth at P 1 P 2 . Given each set of prices (P 1 and P 2 ), customer equilibrium (δ 1 and δ 2 ) depends on the ordering of the three utilities, U 1 , U 2 , and U b . Here, we provide three sets of conditions (stated in (10)) for solving the customer equilibrium depending on whether there exist balking customers. Set 1 represents the case in which joining is preferred over balking, and hence customers join either server 1 or 2 (i.e., δ 1 + δ 2 1). Set 2 represents the case in which customers are indifferent between joining and balking and there exist balking customers (i.e., δ 1 + δ 2 < 1). Set 3 provides a boundary case between sets 1 and 2, which represents the situation in which customers are indifferent between joining and balking and all customers choose joining. It is straightforward to show that any pair (δ 1 , δ 2 ) satisfying one of the preceding three sets of conditions is a Nash equilibrium of the customer queueing game:
One can also specify other sets of sufficient conditions for the customer equilibrium where U 1 U 2 . However, without loss of generality, we can ignore such cases in studying servers' pricing games. The reason is that the server with a lower customer joining utility would have no customers joining it; hence, it would have an incentive to decrease its price until its customer joining utility matches that of the other server. Similarly, we can also ignore the case in which in equilibrium U 1 < U b and U 2 < U b , as all customers would choose to balk. In other words, in considering the servers' pricing competition, the three sets of conditions stated in (10) are enough to characterize customer equilibria.
In general, to derive the closed-form solution for the customer equilibrium or to even discuss equilibrium uniqueness is highly challenging as it involves mapping from the two-dimensional strategy set (δ 1 and δ 2 ) to the three-dimensional utility set and relies heavily on the topological properties of the set of strategies (Hassin and Roet-Green 2017) . Fortunately, to conduct analysis of the pricing game between the two servers, we do not need the closed-form expressions of customer equilibrium joining probabilities. Instead, in deriving a server's best response function, we can list the sufficient conditions stated in (10) as the constraints in the server's revenue maximization problem, a strategy first adopted by Chen and Wan (2003) . Furthermore, by utilizing the feature of the revenue maximization problem of each server, we can use a general set of looser conditions to replace all three sets of conditions stated in (10), as illustrated in the following subsection.
Two Servers' Pricing Competition Game
We are now ready to analyze the first-stage price competition game between two servers. We first derive the best response function of one server by assuming that the other server's price is fixed and then find the intersecting point of the two best response functions. As it is infeasible to derive the closed-form expression of the customer equilibrium joining strategy, we consider the corresponding equilibrium arrival rate as an implicit function of prices defined by (10).
To avoid trivial cases, we assume that each server is capable of attracting at least one customer by charging a price of 0 when there are no customers in the system, which implies that R > θ(β + 1)/(2µ). Define Π i as server i's profit. We take server 1 as an example to illustrate how to identify its best response on pricing. Server 1's revenue maximization problem solves the following optimization problem:
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Similarly, we can find the best response function of server 2. There are two points worth mentioning about the server's constrained optimization problem. First, as the customer equilibrium joining probability cannot be expressed as the closed-form expressions of the prices of the two servers, we use constraints (12)- (14) to represent the functional relationship between the customer equilibrium joining probabilities and the prices. Second, to avoid the cumbersome customer equilibrium conditions in (10), we can technically treat δ 1 and δ 2 as decision variables and use looser conditions in constraints (12)- (14) to capture customer equilibrium. To see this equivalence, note that δ 1 is in the objective function of server 1 (see (11)), and thus the maximization of server 1's revenue function forces δ 1 to be as large as possible. Consequently, either the constraint (13) is binding or in (14) δ 1 + δ 2 1, which indeed forces the constraints (12)- (14) to degenerate into one of the three sets of conditions stated in (10). (Note that the constraint 0 δ 2 < µ is captured in server 2's optimization problem.) Hence, solving the preceding constrained optimization problem yields the best response function for server 1.
As it is difficult to conduct the general price equilibrium analysis, we shall instead focus on the symmetric Nash equilibrium for the pricing game, in which two servers adopt the same pricing strategy. If the symmetric Nash equilibrium does not exist, then we complement our analysis with numerical studies to explore what kind of equilibrium form it may take. Also note that the constraints (12)- (14) represent all of the customer equilibria given a general price pair (P 1 , P 2 ); hence, the pricing game is studied over a very wide range. After we obtain the symmetric equilibrium price, we check whether the corresponding customer equilibrium is a PPE.
2 If it is a PPE, we can then claim that this symmetric price equilibrium is valid. It can be shown that if the symmetric price charged by the two servers is higher thanP, then the PPE is "balking." That is, no customer will join these two servers. Hence, to avoid the trivial cases of zero demand, price variables must be in the range of [0,P].
The price equilibrium structure depends on the relative magnitude of service rate µ compared with two thresholds, which are functions ofμ/2,μ, andμ, wherẽ
andμ is the service rate that solves Equation (47) in Online Appendix D.
Specifically, we consider the following three cases: fast servers with service rate µ > min{μ,μ/2}, moderate-speed servers with service rate min{μ,μ/2} µ min{μ,μ/2}, and slow servers with service rate µ < min{μ,μ/2}. First, we briefly summarize the equilibrium results on the market coverage and customer utility in these three cases as follows. For the fast servers, all of the customers join the service, and their utility of joining is larger than that of balking. For the moderatespeed servers, all of the customers join the service, and their utility of joining equals that of balking. For the slow servers, some customers join the service and the others balk, and their utility of joining equals that of balking. In the following, we only present the results on the equilibrium price and its comparison with the traditional counterpart, in addition to the sensitivity analysis with respect to the loss aversion parameters. We also present the interesting conclusion that competition may be beneficial to a server when customers are loss averse. The detailed mathematical analysis can be found in Online Appendix D.
Fast Server.
In this case, two overcapacitated servers compete for a relatively small population of potential customers. It turns out there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. When µ > min{μ,μ/2}, there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium between the two identical servers, denoted as P As shown in the proof of Proposition 5, ifμ <μ/2, which requires the unit-time-cost-adjusted service reward (R/θ) to be above a certain threshold represented by some function of α and β, we have
for any µ >μ. When α β 1, the conditionμ <μ/2 is always satisfied, asμ ∞. Thus, when the service reward is relatively high, such thatμ <μ/2, by (15), loss aversion toward waiting time drives the equilibrium price up, whereas loss aversion toward the net monetary reward drives the equilibrium price down. When customers care more about the loss resulting from a long waiting time, the server sets its price higher to decrease congestion, and the other server unfortunately thinks the same way. As a result, congestion is not reduced, but price is increased. When customers are more loss averse toward the net reward, both servers want to undercut the other server's price, resulting in a lower equilibrium price. This result is similar to that obtained in the literature on price competition in the goods market, which concludes that loss aversion toward price lowers equilibrium prices and benefits customers, whereas loss aversion toward product mismatch increases prices and softens competition (Zhou 2011 , Heidhues and Kőszegi 2008 , Karle and Peitz 2014 . In a case whereμ <μ/2, it would be interesting to further compare the equilibrium price in (15) with the traditional price where the reference effect is not considered. The traditional equilibrium prices in the fast server case (Online Appendix E provides the detailed derivation) are
which is very similar to (15), except that (15) has one extra loss aversion parameter-dependent term.
Proposition 6. When two servers are identical and µ <μ/2, the equilibrium price involving reference-dependent customers is higher respectively, lower than that in the traditional case when 3β > 2α + 1 respectively, 3β < 2α +1 . Furthermore, the equilibrium price involving loss-neutral customers i.e., α β 1 is the same as that in the traditional case i.e., P Whenμ <μ/2, if α and β are equal and greater than 1, then condition 3β > 2α + 1 holds. Proposition 6 shows that the equilibrium price is higher than that in the traditional case. This implies that the effect of loss aversion toward waiting time dominates the effect of loss aversion toward net reward. This is due to the nature of waiting time uncertainty, which makes it more likely for customers to experience a loss in waiting time than in price.
Moderate-Speed Server.
When the capacity level decreases, waiting time increases and customers are more likely to balk. When the capacity level decreases to some critical point, the customers derive the same utility from joining as from balking, which implies that the competition between the two servers is softened. The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium results.
Proposition 7. When two servers are identical and min{μ,μ/2}
µ min{μ,μ/2}, the symmetric Nash equilibrium, denoted as P 
In equilibrium, customers are indifferent between joining the server and balking. Proposition 7 shows that the equilibrium price decreases with loss aversion toward waiting time (β) and increases with loss aversion toward net reward (α), a result that sharply contrasts that in the fast server case. Recall that when the capacity level is moderate, all of the customers join the service, although they are indifferent between joining and balking. When β increases, the customers are more loss averse toward waiting time, and the servers decrease the price to compensate for customer loss in waiting time. However, when α increases, customers are more loss averse toward the net reward, which means they care more about losing the chance of receiving the service and thus the servers can increase the price.
Next, we compare the equilibrium price in (16) to the traditional price, where the reference effect is not considered. The traditional equilibrium prices in a moderate server case (Online Appendix E provides the detailed derivation) are
which are very similar to (16) .
When min{μ,μ/2} µ min{μ,μ/2}, if α and β are equal and greater than 1, condition β < 2α − 1 holds. Proposition 8 shows that the equilibrium price is higher than that in the traditional case. This implies that the effect of loss aversion on net reward dominates the effect of loss aversion on waiting time. Contrary to the fast server case, here customers are indifferent between joining the service and balking. The feeling of a loss in net reward when facing balking (−α(R − P 1 )) is much stronger than that when facing another competitor (−α(P 2 − P 1 )), making loss aversion related to net reward the dominant factor.
Slow Server.
When the capacity level decreases further, some customers choose to balk. In the traditional setting where the reference effect is not considered, Chen and Wan (2003) show that when the market is ample enough, such that balking customers exist, each of the two servers behaves similar to a monopoly and charges its monopoly price. However, this conclusion does not hold in our setting when the reference effect is considered. The change in one server's price not only affects its own arrival rate but also indirectly affects the other server's arrival rate by changing customers' reference points. Thus, these two servers Operations Research, 2018 , vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 761-777, © 2018 are still in competition when the reference effect is present. The equilibrium prices are the solutions of Karuch-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (48)- (57) When there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria, the equilibrium prices are
, and the equilibrium with the highest joining probability is the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. In particular, when α β 1, there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which each server charges its monopoly price, the same as that under the traditional slow server case stated in Online Appendix E .
Although in the slow server case there exist balking customers, the two servers still compete because of the reference effect. Proposition 9 shows that the equilibrium structure in the slow server case is significantly different from the equilibrium structures in the moderate-speed and fast server cases in the following two aspects. First, there may be a continuum of symmetric equilibria when the service rate is below a certain level. Second, the symmetric equilibria may not exist when the service rate is above this level. The first difference can be explained by competition intensity: when the service rate is very low, most customers choose to balk. Hence, the reference points are heavily influenced by the net reward and waiting time associated with the balking option, allowing the competition between the two servers to be relatively weak and still making it possible for the two servers to charge the same price.
The key question is why a symmetric equilibrium may not exist when the service rate is relatively high. The answer lies in the server's profit function being kinked, with the kink point P 1 P 2 . This implies that the right-and left-hand derivatives of the profit function with respect to price are not the same. A symmetric equilibrium, if it exists, requires the left-hand derivative of a server's profit function with respect to its price to be nonnegative and the corresponding right-hand derivative to be nonpositive at the kink point, P 1 P 2 . This implies that the right-hand derivative cannot be larger than the left-hand derivative. However, this necessary condition may be violated in certain situations. Luski (1976) demonstrates such a case in which there exist balking customers and customers are heterogeneous in delay sensitivity, showing that the right-hand derivative is larger than the left-hand derivative for a server's profit function at the point P 1 P 2 . However, Luski (1976) provides the mathematical proof for this statement only without any explanation. We provide our own understanding of the potential reasons for this result. In the setting of Luski (1976) , when two servers set different prices, customers are segmented according to their own delay sensitivity. The highly delay-sensitive customers balk, the delay-insensitive customers join the low-price server, and the moderately delay-sensitive customers join the high-price server. Because of the heterogeneity of the customer delay sensitivity attribute, slightly increasing a server's price in the region right above its competitor's price benefits the server more than doing so in the region right below its competitor's price, as in the former case reduced congestion allows the server (with a price now higher than that of its competitor) to attract the balking customers, which mitigates its demand loss. Indeed, Luski (1976) also shows that when balking customers do not exist, the left-and right-hand derivatives are equal, and a symmetric equilibrium may exist.
Our setting is quite different from that of Luski (1976) . However, a similar rationale can be applied to explain our equilibrium structure. Customer loss aversion (asymmetry between gains and losses) generates the kink in the servers' profit function at point P 1 P 2 . That is, at P 1 P 2 , the marginal profit change when a server (e.g., server 1) increases its price in a region right above P 2 does not equal that when the server does so in a region right below P 2 . As in Luski (1976) , here, the right-hand derivative may be larger than the left-hand derivative. To demonstrate this point, we can "position" the three options, joining the high-price server, joining the low-price server, and balking along the two attributes: the net reward and waiting time. On each attribute, the option to join the high-price server is located between the other two and is hence "closer" to the balking option. Therefore, increasing a server's price in the region right above its competitor's price benefits it more than doing so in the region right below its competitor's price, as in the former case the server is located "closer" to the balking option, and hence this server together with the balking option have more influence on the customer's reference points than the competitor. Consequently, customer loss aversion further mitigates the server's demand loss from the increased price. Indeed, when there is no balking customer, as in the fast-and moderate-speed server cases, symmetric equilibrium exists. Moreover, larger loss aversion parameter values of α and β lead to a larger mitigation effect on the demand loss and thus make symmetric equilibrium less possible, as shown by the following corollary.
Corollary 1.
The function h(α, β, µ, R) increases in α and β.
Corollary 1 and the decrease of threshold 1/[α − 1/(β + 1)] in α and β imply that for a fixed capacity µ with larger loss aversion parameters, α and β, symmetric equilibria are less likely to exist. Figure 2 depicts the existence and nonexistence of symmetric equilibria when we vary α and β, which further illustrates Corollary 1.
When symmetric equilibria do not exist, we conduct numerical experiments to study the equilibrium structure. Specifically, we set the service-related parameters to R 3, θ 1, and µ 0.7. We then vary the degree of Notes. The circles represent the region in which symmetric equilibria exist, and the stars represent the region in which symmetric equilibria do not exist. The two regions together represent the feasible region: θ(β + 1)/(2R) < µ < min{μ,μ/2}. loss aversion on waiting time, β ∈ [2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5], and the degree of loss aversion on net monetary reward, α ∈ [3.5, 4, 4.5, 5, 5.5, 6] . The numerical results show that in all cases, there exist two asymmetric equilibria. Our conclusion here is very insightful: a large market size and customer loss aversion preference can drive two competing servers to provide heterogeneous service products.
Competition May Be Beneficial for a Server
With equilibrium prices (P e 1 , P e 2 ) and joining probabilities (δ e 1 , δ e 2 ), it is easy to calculate the profit of each server under competition. A natural question arises: Is it possible to introduce a competitor to benefit a monopoly? It is well established in the literature (e.g., Chen and Wan 2003) that in a traditional service setting where loss aversion is not considered, it is always beneficial for a server to be a monopoly than to introduce a competitor. Surprisingly, in our setting with loss-averse customers, there are cases in which introducing a competitor actually benefits a monopolistic server. In the following, we first conduct a simple analysis of the changes of the customer joining and balking utilities when a competitor is introduced into the market to understand why competition may be beneficial. We then provide numerical examples to illustrate this point.
Consider that a server in a monopoly market charges price P, and the equilibrium joining probability for customers is δ p . Assuming that the service capacity is small enough, such that δ p < 1/2, we then have U(Join) U(Balk) < 0. Now an identical server enters the market. Assume that both servers still charge price P, and customers still join each server with probability δ p . Substituting price P and customer joining probability δ p into the customer joining utility expression stated in (8) and the baking utility expression stated in (9), we obtain
From this, we obtain
where the inequality holds because 1 − δ p < 2 − δ p and U b < 0. Therefore, introducing a competitor can make the joining option more favorable than balking, and thus customers may join the original server with a higher probability. This implies that a server may earn more revenue in a competitive market than in a monopolistic market. Next, we numerically show that competition can benefit a server. We set the degrees of loss aversion on waiting time and monetary reward to β 1.81 and Operations Research, 2018 , vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 761-777, © 2018 α 2.25, respectively. We also set R 5 and θ 1. In the first example, we set µ 1.03. This falls into the fast server case (μ < µ <μ/2). It turns out that the profit of the monopoly is 1.7065 with price P * 2.7087 and joining probability δ * 0.63, whereas the profit of the duopolistic server is 1.7681 with an equilibrium price of P e 3.5363. In the second example, we set µ 1.02. This falls into the moderate-speed server case (μ < µ < µ <μ/2). In this case, the profit of the monopoly is 1.6707 with price P * 2.6947 and joining probability δ * 0.62, whereas the profit of the duopolistic server is 1.7885 with an equilibrium price of P e 3.5769. Both numerical examples illustrate that a server can benefit from competition when customers are loss averse.
Here, having more servers in the market increases the overall service capacity and allows more customers to consume the service. This changes customers' reference points, and balking without consumption of service is deemed to be a larger loss. The larger benefit of the joining option relative to the balking option allows servers to charge a price even higher than their monopolistic price and achieve a profit even larger than their monopolistic profit. This phenomenon is similar to the compromise effect in the marketing literature, which states that expanding the choice set for customers may increase the demand for a certain option (see Simonson 1989 for a discussion on this effect in context-dependent customer preferences).
Conclusions
In this study, we consider a customer's overall expected utility from a service to be the sum of her intrinsic and gain-loss utilities. Gain-loss utility measures the deviation of a customer's attribute values, the net monetary reward and delay based on her reference points. We consider both monopoly and duopoly markets and examine customers' equilibrium queueing strategies in both. On the basis of the customer equilibrium analysis, we further analyze servers' pricing decisions.
Our conclusions are novel in at least three aspects. First, with reference effects and loss aversion, it is typical to have multiple equilibria, a finding that contradicts the unique equilibrium found by studies that do not consider loss aversion. Second, we show that the loss aversion effect polarizes the queues in a monopoly market, making long queues even longer and short queues even shorter. We also show that profit-and welfare-maximizing prices are not the same. Embedding the gain-loss utility into the welfare function makes social welfare smaller than server profit as customers care more about losses than gains. Third, in a symmetric duopoly market, we examine the existence of the symmetric price equilibrium and conduct a sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium price depending on the magnitude of the service rate. In a largecapacity system (i.e., when the service speed is high), a unique symmetric price equilibrium exists. All customers are served and equally split between the two servers. Moreover, when the service reward is high, the equilibrium price decreases in the loss aversion parameter on the monetary attribute but increases in the loss aversion parameter on the delay attribute. In a moderate-capacity system (i.e., when service speed is moderate), there also exists a unique symmetric price equilibrium. This symmetric price equilibrium, however, increases in the loss aversion parameter on the monetary attribute but decreases in the loss aversion parameter on the delay attribute. In a small-capacity system (i.e., when service speed is low), we show that a symmetric equilibrium may not exist. We then numerically find that there may exist two asymmetric equilibria in this case. Our result from the slow server case demonstrates two driving forces for two identical servers to offer heterogeneous service products: the existence of balking customers and the customer's loss aversion preference. Strikingly, we show that a server's equilibrium profit in a duopoly market can be larger than its monopoly profit. As the customer choice set is expanded by introducing a competitive server, more incentives to join can be granted to customers, as reference-dependent utility is affected by available alternatives.
Our study appears to be the first to examine the reference effect on service systems when customers are loss averse toward both price and waiting time. We show that both customers' equilibrium joining strategies and firms' pricing decisions are significantly different from the results obtained without considering the reference effect or considering only the reference effect in terms of waiting time. We hope our work stimulates empirical research testing our analytical results in different service systems, such as those in the healthcare field and at call centers. Future research may also consider analyzing loss-averse customers with observable queues. the monopoly setting. Consequently, similar to that stated in Proposition 1, there exist three different customer equilibrium structures corresponding to the cases of µ 1/2, 1/2 < µ <μ/2, and µ μ/2. As there are two servers in the duopoly market, here the capacity thresholds in the monopoly case, 1 andμ, shall be divided by 2.
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